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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
THE JUVENILE AT WAIVER: IS COUNSEL REQUIRED?
The petitioner was before juvenile court on charges of committing a
battery. Defendant and his mother were advised of their right to
counsel, but not to appointed counsel at certification, a proceeding
which determines whether the juvenile court should waive jurisdiction
in favor of district court. Neither defendant nor his family was
financially able to employ counsel. Counsel was appointed only after
the defendant had been transferred to the district court for criminal
prosecution. On motion to vacate judgment and sentence on the
subsequent criminal conviction, Held: An indigent juvenile offender
has no right to appointed counsel in a transfer proceeding. State v.
Acuna, 428 P.2d 658 (N.M. 1967).
Juvenile courts were designed primarily to judge the juvenile's con-
duct and, when necessary, to accord him appropriate treatment. Be-
cause the goal was rehabilitation and treatment, rather than punish-
ment, informal procedures were integrated into the juvenile court
system. Adjudication was characterized as civil instead of criminal,
thereby exempting it from criminal due process requirements.' In
recent years, observers have charged the juvenile court with abuse
of informal procedures 2 and failure to provide adequate rehabili-
tation.3
The court in the principal case rendered its decision prior to In re
'Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARv. L. REv. 104, 109 (1909). See, e.g., In re
Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) ; Weber v. Doust, 84 Wash. 330, 146 P. 623 (1915).2 Handier, The Juvenile Court and the Adversary System: Problems of Function
and Forn, 1965 Wis. L. Rv. 7, 12-14.
'REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION OW CRIME IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUM-
BIA 773 (1966):
In fiscal 1966 approximately 66 percent of the 16-17 year old juveniles referred to
the Court by the Youth Aid Division had been before the court previously. In
1965, 56 percent of those in the Receiving Home were repeaters. The SRI study
revealed that 61 percent of the sample Juvenile Court referrals in 1965 had been
previously referred at least once and that 42 percent had been referred at least twice
before.
The high recidivism rates indicate that juvenile court treatment is inadequate. See In
re Gault, 387 U.S. at 22 (1967). But see RESEARCHi REVIEW, DEPT. OF INSTITUTIONS,
STATE OF WASHINGTON 73-76 (December 1964), indicating that compared with the
District of Columbia rate of 56% recidivism, the rate for Washington was only 16%
in 1963. The report also indicates that the recidivism rate does not adequately reflect
the success of the juvenile program because many juveniles, after a second or third
referral, make a satisfactory adjustment to life. However, the report also states that
the recidivism rates are perhaps the best indicia of the success of the program of
rehabilitation, absent better criteria.
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Gault,' but considered that case on rehearing. Prior to its consider-
ation of Gault, the New Mexico court predicated its reasoning on
the distinction between juvenile and criminal proceedings, the right
to counsel being accorded only in the latter. The court reasoned that
in a criminal proceeding, a defendant was guaranteed counsel only
at the critical stages. The certification proceeding was not a critical
stage because no constitutional rights could be waived or lost. Be-
cause a juvenile had no constitutional right to exemption from the
criminal process, no relevant rights were affected by mere transfer
of jurisdiction. The court therefore refused to characterize the waiver
proceeding as a critical stage. Kent v. United States" was viewed
as an interpretation of the District of Columbia waiver statute.
On rehearing, the court distinguished In re Gault' because it dealt
solely with delinquency adjudication.
The court in the principal case misconstrued the critical stage
analysis and failed to give adequate consideration to the Kent-Gault
rationale. A proper analysis would have indicated that the juvenile
has a right to appointed counsel if he or his parents lack the means
to provide for an attorney.
To be deemed a critical stage a criminal proceeding must involve
loss of substantial rights. The rights lost need not be constitutional.'
Thus the court in the principal case erred in failing to characterize the
waiver proceeding as a critical stage because the defendant was con-
stitutionally exempt from the criminal process.' The proper issue
was whether a juvenile is substantially interested in remaining subject
to juvenile court jurisdiction.
The interest in remaining in juvenile court is substantial.' Trained
'387 U.S. 1 (1967).
5383 U.S. 541 (1966). The Court held that under the District of Columbia
statutory requirement of full investigation for transfer, counsel has the right to view
social records. If jurisdiction is waived, adequate reasons for waiver must be given,
:n writing, by the juvenile court judge.
'D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-914, as amended, § 11-1553 (Supp. IV 1965).
1387 U.S. 1 (1967).
' Cf. Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 134 (1967). In holding that counsel is required
at probation revocation proceedings, the Court stated:
There was no occasion in Gideon to enumerate the various stages in a criminal
proceeding at which counsel was required, but Townsend, Moore and Hamilton,
when the Betts requirement of special circumstances is stripped away by Gideon,
clearly stand for the proposition that appointment of counsel for an indigent is
required at every stage of a criminal proceeding where substantial rights of a
criminal accused may be affected.
See also Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S.
52 (1961).
9428 P.2d at 659.
"°This is true even though In re Gault demonstrated the deficiencies of juvenile
[ VOL. 43 : 639
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personnel in juvenile houses of detention make treatment, though not
always effective, at least available to the juvenile;" this would seem
less likely to be the case in penal institutions. Moreover, even if
the available treatment were ineffective, the juvenile is not mixed
with hardened criminals nor does the stigma of a criminal record
attach to "conviction" in juvenile court.
If the juvenile's interest in remaining subject to juvenile court
jurisdiction is substantial, who is to protect that interest? Neither
caseworkers nor parents can isolate and present legally relevant facts
for the court's consideration. An unaided judge faced with a crowded
docket is not equipped to protect the juvenile's interest. Only an
attorney can insure representation of the individual juvenile's interests
at waiver.
The critical stage test is satisfied by waiver proceedings. 2 In
court procedure. The Court in Gault did not resolve the seeming paradox posed by
the holding in Kent that there is a right to effective counsel at waiver and the
assertion in Gault that juvenile proceedings are very similar to criminal proceed-
ings. If there is so little difference between juvenile and criminal court proceedings,
why should counsel be considered necessary to protect juvenile jurisdiction in Kent?
The cases can be reconciled in two ways.
First, juvenile court could be considered sufficiently like criminal court to warrant
the application of criminal due process requirements, but not so similar as to obvi-
ate all differences in treatment between juvenile and criminal court.
Second, Kent recognized that effective counsel is necessary to protect the possibil-
ity of benefit to the child from juvenile court'treatment. Gault was concerned with
juvenile court adjudication, which necessarily arises after the issue of waiver has
been determined. Although adjudication was considered criminal for the application
of due process requirements, this does not obliterate the distinction between the
proceedings at other stages. Thus, juvenile court detention or probation, though
very similar to criminal court disposition of cases, may well provide more and better
caseworkers per child detained, etc.
' Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. at 554 (1966).
'"See generally Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Gideon v. Wain-
wright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963); Griffin v.
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
No analogy is required if the Kent rationale is viewed as controlling in the
principal case, even accepting the premise that Kent interpreted only the District of
Columbia statute. The waiver statute in the principal case closely parallels the
statute construed in Kent. D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-914 (1961), as amended § 11-1553
(Supp. IV 1965) reads:
If a child sixteen years of age or older is charged with an offense which would
amount to a felony in the case of an adult, or any child charged with an offense
which if committed by an adult is punishable by death or life imprisonment, the
judge may, after fill investigation, waive jurisdiction and order such child held
for trial under the regular procedures of the court which would have jurisdiction
of such offence if committed by an adult.
(Emphasis added).
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-8-27 (Supp. 1966) reads:
[If] any child fourteen (14) years of age or older is charged in juvenile court with
an offense which would be a felony if committed by an adult, and if the court
after full investigation deems it contrary to the best interest of such child or of
the public to retain jurisdiction, the court may in its discretion certify such child
for proper criminal proceedings to any court which would have trial jurisdiction
19681
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White v. Maryland:l the court held that because defendant could
enter a plea, the preliminary hearing was a critical stage requiring
appointment of counsel. Like the defendant in White and other
cases14 the juvenile is faced with a dilemma at waiver. If he stands
mute, he might be considered hostile to the court's authority and
not a fit subject for rehabilitation. 5 If he responds to the case against
him, his attempts at exculpation may not only incriminate him, but
of such offense if committed by an adult; but no child under fourteen (14) years
of age shall be so certified.
(Emphasis added). Both require full investigation prior to waiver. If full investiga-
tion requires that the accused have effective right to counsel, as Gault interpreted
Kent to hold, then it may be said that the Supreme Court recognized that substantial
interests are involved in the waiver proceeding. If substantial interests were not
involved, there would be little need for effective counsel in order to comply with the
investigation requirement.
For Washington, see WAsH. Rav. CODE § 13.04.120 (1962):
If, upon investigation, it shall appear that a child has been arrested upon the
charge of having committed a crime, the court, in its discretion, may order such
child to be turned over to the proper officer' for trial under the provisions of the
criminal code.
(Emphasis added). Unlike the District of Columbia and New Mexico waiver stat-
utes, the Washington statute establishes no criteria upon which the decision to
transfer is determined. Washington cases construing the statute have held that a
hearing is required prior to waiver, Dillenburg v. Maxwell, 68 Wash. Dec. 2d 481, 413
P.2d 940 (1966). It is unclear whether counsel is required at waiver. In the second
Dillenburg case, 70 Wash. Dec. 2d 325, 422 P.2d 783 (1967), the court held that on
rehearing to determine whether transfer was properly effected, defendant was entitled
to counsel. If counsel is required at rehearing, it may also be required at the
original transfer hearing. 70 Wash. Dec. 2d at 333a, 422 P.2d at 789.
A recent Washington decision, Lesperance v. Superior Court, 72 Wash. Dec. 2d 567,
434 P.2d 602 (1967), held that counsel is required in the adjudication of delinquency.
Since the court relied solely on In re Gault it may be argued that such a decision
should apply equally to waiver proceedings. See discussion accompanying note 19 infra.
In view of the court's reliance on Gault, an argument that provision of counsel at
waiver is not feasible will no longer be persua;ive. Because counsel will be accorded
in the subsequent proceeding, whether juvenile or criminal, there is little additional
administrative burden in providing counsel at waiver.
Moreover, the court's reliance on Gault indicates that in Washington Gaidt will be
applied retroactively. The Lesperance trial began after the Gault decision. Hence,
there was no need to cite Gault as controlling unless it were viewed as having
retroactive application.
" 373 U.S. 59 (1963).
"*See also Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961). There, defendant had not
been assigned counsel at arraignment, the stage at which, according to Alabama law,
certain defenses must be asserted or lost. A showing of actual loss was not required.
It was the possibility which called for appointment of counsel. Id. Vaiver raises
similar problems. See note 18 infra.
" See 67 COLUSm. L. Ray. 281, 316 (1967). For analogy to the criminal court
procedure see Mempa v. Rhay, supra note 8. It should be noted that in M[empa the
court cited as crucial the fact that a plea of guilty on the original charge may be
prompted by promise of probation. When defendant is without counsel at revocation,
he cannot effectively withdraw his previous guilty plea. Thus, the Court found that
counsel was required at revocation.
A similar situation exists at the certification proceeding. The juvenile is ex-
pected to cooperate with the court in order to indicate an attitude conducive to
rehabilitation. Yet, the result of his cooperation may prejudice his case in a subse-
quent delinquency proceeding. Certainly, then, counsel is needed as much at a certifi-
cation proceeding as at probation revocation proceedings.
[ VOL. 43 : 639
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may also overstate the degree of his criminality. Beyond silence may
lie exposure to the criminal process; and error in setting forth his case
may lead to confinement for the remainder of his minority, or exposure
to criminal prosecution. 6
The juvenile has rights to be lost at waiver whether he is deprived
of the benefits of the juvenile correction system 7 or remains subject
to it after having muddled his case. The waiver hearing is therefore
a critical stage of a subsequent proceeding, regardless of its outcome. 1 8
The New Mexico court's advice that defendant could retain counsel
may be viewed as recognition that the procedure could result in the
loss of substantial rights. Given this recognition, the court's failure
to appoint counsel may be regarded as a denial of equal protection. 9
Analysis of the reasoning in Kent and Gault shows that counsel is
required at a waiver hearing independent of its status as a critical
stage in the subsequent proceedings. Dicta in Gault indicate that the
Court now considers the Kent case to have been decided on constitu-
tional grounds.20
Kent alone, without the Gault interpretation, may be viewed as
controlling the determination of right to counsel at waiver in the
principal case. The statutes involved are similar." Given the Court's
"With recognition in Gault that the juvenile court proceeding has criminal
phases which invoke due process safeguards, the waiver hearing is no longer
characterizable as a civil precursor to criminal arraignment. Regardless of its out-
come, the juvenile may be exposed to criminal sanctions.
'
T See text accompanying note 10 supra. Kent and Gault apparently, however,
disagree as to the value of the juvenile court system.
"Clearly, the transfer proceeding is a critical stage of the criminal process ifjurisdiction is waived to adult court. See text accompanying notes 10-18 supra.
Moreover, In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) indicates that the Supreme Court views
juvenile detention as sufficiently like criminal detention to warrant application of
the right to counsel at the adjudication stage. If the juvenile muddles his case at
certification because he lacks counsel, the right to counsel guaranteed by Gault may
become meaningless. What the juvenile admits or denies at certification without
counsel may well set the bounds within which counsel must operate during the
adjudication procedure.
For similar situations in adult court proceedings, see White and Hamilton at
notes 12 & 14 supra, where the Supreme Court indicates that outcome or actual loss
of rights is not determinative of the existence of a critical stage.
"Cf. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
' Gault cited Kent as holding that the right to counsel at waiver was a necessary
part of a hearing which must measure up to the essentials of due process and fair
treatment. It spoke of itself as reiterating that view when it held that counsel was
required at the adjudication proceeding:
Just as in Kent v. United States... we indicated our agreement with the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit that the assistance
of counsel is essential for purposes of waiver proceedings, so we hold now that it
is equally essential for the determination of delinquency, carrying with it the awe-
some prospect of incarceration in a state institution until the juvenile reaches the
age of 21.
387 U.S. at 36-37.
" See note 12 supra.
1968]
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requirement in Kent that the statute be read in the light of constitu-
tional principles of due process and the assistance of counsel,22 the
Kent result should have been adopted.
Gault established that the loss of liberty attendant upon a juvenile
court determination of guilt is analogous to criminal incarceration.23
If counsel is required at the adjudication stage, counsel should also
by implication be required at the waiver proceeding where access to
juvenile court is determined. 24
Adequate consideration of either the critical stage of Kent-Gault
rationale should have led the court to the conclusion that counsel was
required for defendant in the principal case. It is to be hoped that
other courts, guided by the Gault decision and its interpretation of
Kent, would require appointment of counsel at waiver. Decisions such
as the principal case bode ill for state court reception of Supreme
Court cases relating to juvenile court due process.
SURVEY OF ABORTION REFORM LEGISLATION*
During the past year governments have felt increasing pressure for
reform of their abortion statutes. California, Colorado, North Caro-
lina, and Great Britain' recently enacted new abortion statutes.
Abortion statutes 2 seek two ends: 1) a definition of the crime of
2 383 U.S. at 551 (1966).
' See note 18 supra.
-'For further discussion on the distinction between juvenile proceedings and
criminal proceedings, see note 10 supra.
*"Abortion" elicits numerous moral and philosophical responses. This note does
not attempt to review the general discussions which surround these responses. This
posture was adopted for two reasons: 1) the extent to which the new abortion
statutes evidence a shift of moral or philosophical stance is at best conjectural and
2) the doctrinal approach has received generous space in other works. See generally
ABORTION- AND THE LAW (D. Smith ed. 1967), first published in 17 W. RES. L. REv.
369 (1965). See also, Lorensen, Abortion and the Crime-Sin Spectrum, 70 WEST. VA.
L. REv. 20 (1967).
'The official text of the British statute is not available at the time of this
writing. Reference in this note to that statute is based on the reproduction of the
crucial sections of the Abortion Bill as of its second reading in the House of
Commons found at Samuels, Termination of Pregnancy-A Lawyer Considers the
Arguments, 7 MED. ScI. & LAw 10, 11 (1967).
2 Under the common law, induced abortion prior to "quickening" was not crim-
inal. Comment, The Legal Status of Therapeutic Abortion, 27 U. PITT. L. REv. 669,
672 (1965-66). "Quickening" was taken as that stage of gestation-usually sixteen
to twenty weeks following conception-when the mother first feels fetal movements.
The rule is perhaps best stated by Blackstone: "Life... begins in contemplation of
law as soon as the infant is able to stir in the mother's womb." I CO.MM1ENTARIES
129 (14th ed. 1803). It was believed that life or soul entered the fetus at this time.
This view is often attributed to St. Thomas Aquinas. G. WILLIAMS, THE SANCTITY
[ Vol.. 43 : 639
